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Offshore Financial Centers
The Bank of International Settlements clas-
sifies tax havens as “offshore banking centers” 
or regional financial centers that did not grow 
organically.1  Tax havens share some of the 
same characteristics that include but are not 
limited to:
 ▪ Effective Banks Secrecy
 ▪ Professional or commercial secrecy obliga-
tions preventing lawyers, accountants or 
company employees from revealing confi-
1 Ronen Palan.  The Offshore World:  Sovereign 
Markets, Virtual Places, & Nomad Billionaires 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 39.
From The Panama Papers To Odebrecht: Illicit Financial 
Flows From Brazil
Ben Marques
dential information about clients, including 
violations of other countries’ laws
 ▪ Company and trust laws with very loose dis-
closure requirements
 ▪ Few, and preferable no restrictions or regu-
lations concerning financial transactions
 ▪ Ease of establishment of new companies
 ▪ The territory must possess political and eco-
nomic stability
 ▪ The tax haven should be either supported 
by a large international financial market, 
or equipped with sophisticated information 
exchange facilities and/or be within easy 
reach of a major financial center
Abstract
Brazil has garnered the world´s attention recently with a backdrop of political scandals, cor-
ruption allegations, world-renown sporting competitions and an economy in turmoil.  It has 
been nothing less than a roller coaster for the citizens of Brazil who have savored some of the 
ups and downs of the last ten years.  
In 2007 Brazil was the darling of the developing world. It appeared that the nation that is 
paradoxically called the “nation of tomorrow” had finally arrived at its tomorrow.  With the 
commodity boom stocking its coffers, millions of Brazilians out of poverty due to the policies 
of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil could go through the recession relatively unsca-
thed until the commodity market collapsed and Brazil suffered its own recession in 2015 along 
with series of political calamities.  Aside from the impeachment of President Rousseff and 
Operação Lava Jato (the so-called Car Wash scandal that has implicated several politicians 
due to bribery through kickbacks they received through the oil giant Petrobras) that was in 
full swing there was another socio-political phenomenon that was not receiving the press 
coverage that it was deserving.  The Brazilian government was and still is in a struggle to 
emphasize accountability in the realm of money laundering and illicit finance flows; this en-
deavor has proved cumbersome as off shore tax havens have and continue to provide a refuge 
for the funds of fraudulent companies such as Odebrecht and unethical individuals.  The abuse 
of offshore tax havens by the Brazilian political elite, by the “outing” of the Panama Papers 
as well as the use of OFCs (Offshore Financial Centers) by Odebrecht has forced the Brazilian 
government to take action and stem the flow of illicit finance.  
The expanded version of this paper was written at the George Washington University, Inter-
national Transcriminal Organizations.
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 ▪ The territory´s name should not be tainted 
by scandals
 ▪ It is desirable that such havens have agree-
ments with major countries to avoid double 
taxation.2
The main appeal of tax havens is their lack 
of taxes and regulation.  Several of these tax 
havens also knowns as offshore financial cen-
ters are in the Caribbean such as the Cayman 
Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, Bermuda, Ba-
hamas, and the British Virgin Islands, some 
are in Europe such as Switzerland and Lux-
emburg.  Because of the fame along with the 
proximity that certain OFCs have, Brazilians 
are inclined to use OFCs in Switzerland or 
those found in the Caribbean.  From 2004 to 
2013 Brazil has averaged about $22 billion per 
year in illicit finance outflows. Such a figure 
is damaging to an emerging market as Bra-
zil where that money could be used for much 
needed infrastructure, educational or civic de-
velopment.  Globally, the amount of accumu-
lated wealth registered in offshore havens is at 
about $21 trillion or around 18% of the aggre-
gate global wealth (as opposed to global gross 
domestic product at around $70 trillion).3 
Revelations through media have assisted in 
casting light on where these outflows go to and 
who exactly is behind them.
The Panama Papers and Brazil
When the Panama Papers came out in 2015 
several prominent Brazilians were among 
those listed as having offshore accounts and of 
those named a notable fraction has been in-
volved in corrupt business dealings or outright 
money laundering.  The former Speaker of the 
Brazilian house Eduardo Cunha, Senator Edi-
son Lobão, ex-federal representative Joal Lyra 
and several families tied to construction firms 
2 Ibid., 40.  
3 Anastasia Nesvetailova and Ronen Palan.  “Off-
shore Finance and Shadow Banking: Regulation of 
the Dark Corners of the Financial System,” Bank-
ing and Financial Services Policy Report 33, no. 5 
(2014): 20.
such as the Mendés Junio, Queiroz Galvão and 
Schahin families have all been “outed” by the 
Panama Paper as having offshore accounts 
through the Panamanian law firm Mossack 
Fonseca. The 11.5 million documents released 
that are the Panama Papers reveal a company 
that specializes in hiding money for politicians 
and public figures from around the world. 
Panama´s attorney general, Kenia Porcell, 
said she had information that identified Mos-
sack Fonseca as a criminal organization that is 
dedicated to hiding monetary assets from sus-
picious origins; she said the firm´s Brazilian 
representative had allegedly been instructed 
to conceal documents and to remove evidence 
of illegal activities relating to the Lava Jato 
case.4  Charges have been brought against four 
individuals including the Mossack Fonseca 
partners as a result of the Panamanian investi-
gation. The Panamanian attorney general fur-
ther stipulated that the money in the Mossack 
Fonseca business dealings with Brazil come 
from bribes, circulated via certain corporate 
entities to return bleached or washed to Pana-
ma. There has been considerable fallout from 
the Panama Papers in Brazil and the political 
elite have felt the effects more pronounced 
then perhaps other implicated.
Once one of the most powerful men in the 
country, the former speaker of the house Ed-
uardo Cunha, was arrested in late 2016 after 
having been charged with having over $40 
million bribery money in secret bank accounts 
offshore.  Eduardo Cunha is currently going 
through an appeal process.  Another politician 
to be convicted from the the Panama Papers 
is the former governor of the state of Rio de 
Janeiro, Sergio Cabral.  Mr. Cabral was being 
awarded 5% on construction contracts award-
ed in the state of Rio de Janeiro by the cor-
ruption-ridden Odebrecht construction com-
4 Juliette Garside, “Panama Paper:  Mossack 
Fonseca founders arrested over bribery scandal,” 
The Guardian.  February 10, 2017, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/panama-
papers-mossack-fonseca-offices-raided-over-ode-
brecht-bribery-scandal
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pany.  The former governor of Rio de Janeiro 
would then pass off those bribes to two men 
named Renato and Marcelo Chebar who in 
turn placed the funds in several offshore banks 
set up through several front companies.  Two 
of these front companies set up by the Chebars 
were Orly Trading Company and Wadebridge 
Development Inc.5  Wadebridge Inc. was inter-
mediated by a bank named Global Line Asset 
Management, all these companies were oper-
ated by the Mossack and Fonseca law firm in 
Panama.6  The Chebar brothers along with the 
ex-governor Sergio Cabral were all convicted 
for money laundering and other crimes in as-
sociation with Operação Lava Jato. Ironically 
these companies set up by the Chebar broth-
ers were dissolved as soon as the investiga-
tion into the Lava Jato gained steam.  Brazil-
ian politicians are not the only ones to feel the 
sting from the Panama Papers several promi-
nent businessmen have also been implicated 
in these telling documents and none has been 
more notorious than Brazil´s former richest 
man, Eike Batista.  
Eike Batista was jailed in a maximum-secu-
rity prison in Bangu, Rio de Janeiro until he 
was released under habeas corpus awaiting 
trial for charges of bribery.7 Batista ran sever-
al companies in the logistics, petroleum, and 
mining sectors in Brazil and the gregarious en-
trepreneur was striving to become the world´s 
richest person.  Then the Panama Papers came 
out and divulged the fact that the Brazilian bil-
lionaire let the law firm Mossack and Fonseca 
run 22 offshore businesses for him.  These 
dealings along with the accusations that he 
5 André Shalders. Leia que os Panama Papers fa-
lam do esquema de Cabral no exterior,” Poder 360. 
January 27, 2017, https://www.poder360.com.br/
panama-papers/leia-o-que-os-panama-papers-
revelam-sobre-o-esquema-de-cabral-no-exterior/
6 Ibid.,
7 Thiago Faria, “´Revoluções cometem erros´, 
afirma Eike Batista sobre sua prisão no Lava 
Jato,” O Estado de São Paulo São Paulo, Nov. 29, 
2017. http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/
geral,revolucoes-cometem-erros-afirma-eike-ba-
tista-sobre-sua-prisao-na-lava-jato,70002101849
awarded the former governor of Rio Sergio 
Cabral $16.5 million dollars for contracts in 
the state of Rio de Janeiro has tarnished his 
image (he fully cooperated with authorities, 
still facing several legal battles and charges).8
Antigua & Barbuda, An Offshore 
Paradise?
Illicit actors are surreptitious and in being 
so they need a place to stow or hide their fi-
nances.  The offshore tax havens that are found 
in the Caribbean are a gem for those that are 
willing and or able to transfer their funds so 
that they may be kept private and evade inves-
tigative eyes.  One of the islands in the West 
Indies that has drawn quite a bit of attention 
from its connection to the widely known Ode-
brecht scandal is the island nation of Antigua 
and Barbuda.  The former British colony has is 
an offshore tax haven.  Like several of the tiny 
countries where offshore banking is a thriv-
ing enterprise the actual banks themselves 
in these localities are nothing more than an 
uninviting building with a sign out front.  It 
is with relative ease that one can open an in-
ternational business, LLC, or form a Partner-
ship in Antigua and Barbuda as there are no 
residency requirements and registration pro-
cesses are somewhat smooth though there are 
some stipulations such as having a physical 
address depending on the type of business one 
wishes to found.9 
The two-island nation is no stranger to mon-
ey laundering scandals and has often found 
itself in the midst of such fiascos.  Antigua 
and Barbuda had already achieved notoriety 
through the case of former Ukrainian Prime 
Minister Lazerenko where he bought an An-
tiguan bank named European Federal Credit 
Union in 1997 and laundered about $100 mil-
8 Ibid.,
9 Emile van der Does de Willebois, Emily M. Hal-
ter, Robert A. Harrison, Ji Won Park, and J.C. 
Sharman, The Puppet Masters:  How the Corrupt 
Use Legal Structures to Hide Assets and What to 
Do About It (Washington D.C: Stolen Asset Recov-
ery Initiative, The World Bank 2011), 220-247. 
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lion through there that hailed from his time as 
Prime Minister, in total he laundered about 
$326 million around the world then the U.S. 
Justice Department caught up with him under 
the USA PATRIOT Act.10   The government of 
Antigua and Barbuda suffered a public sham-
ing when the businessman and ambassador 
from the Caribbean country, Bruce Rapport, 
construed several corporate vehicles (CVs) to 
extort money from the Government of Antigua 
and Barbuda (GOAB) when he was apparently 
orchestrating a debt payoff to Japan.11  Through 
investigations the GOAB was able to recover 
the $14 million that was embezzled for Bruce 
Rapport´s personal gain.12 These scandals 
were not as media focused as the Odebrecht 
graft machine that moved millions through an 
Antiguan bank.  
Odebrecht
In St. John´s, the rutted and often smelly 
streets are dotted with banks that cater to 
foreigners and the Structured Operations de-
partment of the Brazilian Construction con-
glomerate Odebrecht was taking full advan-
tage of the Antiguan Capital´s lax regulations 
through the Antiguan Overseas Bank (AOB).13 
The Structured Operations department was 
created for the sole purpose of graft and illicit 
deals.  Hilberto Silva, Fernando Migliaccio, 
and Luiz Eduardo Soares were all Odebrecht 
company men who worked in the Structured 
Operations department in Odebrecht, while 
securing contacts for infrastructure projects 
throughout Latin America.  They were able to 
secure large infrastructure contracts through 
creating fake engineering, construction, and 
consulting companies that used secret bank 
accounts to pay fake invoices submitted by 
fake customers; some of these people they in-
10 Ibid., 202-203. 
11 Ibid., 172-173.
12 Ibid., 174.
13 Michael Smith, Sabrina Valle, and Blake Schmi-
dt, “No One Has Ever Made a Corruption Machine 
Like This One,” Bloomberg Businessweek, June 
8th, 2017.
fluenced were politicians—the company had 
been bankrolling campaigns in Brazil, includ-
ing presidential campaigns.14  Odebrecht  had 
funded campaigns to elect half a dozen presi-
dents in Latin America; buy the friendship of 
heads of state in Angola, Peru, and Venezuela; 
and pay off hundreds of legislators from Pan-
ama to Argentina.15 The Justice Department 
has called Odebrecht the biggest corruption 
case in history, never before has one compa-
ny through illicit finance flows influenced so 
much.  
Because of the ongoing Operação Lava 
Jato investigation (Operation Car Wash) case 
Brazilian police had discovered Odebrecht´s 
accounts in Antigua and Barbuda.  Odebrecht 
was part of a cartel of engineering companies 
that paid bribes and kickbacks in exchange for 
being allowed to rig the bidding for contracts, 
especially at Petrobras (this was the original 
focus of the Car Wash investigation).16  Brazil 
in the 2000s under the leadership of Presi-
dent Lula was growing at an effervescent pace 
and as the country grew so did Odebrecht 
consistently funneling cash to Lula´s allies 
throughout the region.17  The former Brazil-
ian president has  negated any affiliation or 
wrongdoing associated with Odebrecht or the 
Lava Jato case, though he himself has come 
under investigation for corruption charges for 
fraudulent real estate dealings and other fac-
ets of the Lava Jato case. By Odbrecht´s own 
admission in a U.S. District Court in Brooklyn 
in December 2016, the Structured Operations 
department doled out $788 million in bribes 
in Brazil and in 11 other countries, securing 
more than 100 contracts that generated $3.3 
billion of profit for the company.18  The CEO 
of Odebrecht Marcelo Odebrecht told pros-
ecutors that 0.5% to 2% of yearly revenue was 
directed to illicit payoffs mainly to Brazilian 
politicians and executives of state companies, 
14 Ibid., 2.
15 Ibid., 2.
16 Ibid., 6.
17 Ibid., 6.
18 Ibid., 4.
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particularly the national oil company, Petro-
bras.19  Graft expenses was estimated to be at 
about $611 million depending on the demands 
of Odebrecht´s political contracts.20
The Structured Operations department 
was a well-oiled machine that was even in-
cluded in the company´s flow charts it was 
consistently supplemented by a collection of 
Odebrecht employees and contractors with 
special skills such as accountants who set up 
front companies and computer programmers 
who designed and ran a secret messaging sys-
tem.21  Hilberto Silva the fidgety member of 
the Structured Operations department hired 
a Miami lawyer to do paperwork for shell com-
panies and in São Paulo another lawyer did 
up contracts for fake services to back up the 
bribe money.22  By late 2010 Structured Op-
erations had run more than $1 billion through 
Antigua Overseas Bank; the bank was in a li-
quidity crisis and started to collapse, this drew 
the attention of Antiguan regulators.23  With 
$15 million in an AOB account that was one 
of Odebrecht´s biggest and most trusted con-
duits through a shell company called Klienfeld 
Service Ltd, Silva tried to get the money out 
before the suspicious Antiguan authorities 
took action.24  The maneuver to remove the 
funds or buy AOB came too late and suspicious 
transaction reports were filled by the Antiguan 
banking regulators about Kleinfeld and other 
Odebrecht accounts.25  The Antiguan authori-
ties were now on to Odebrecht and in due time 
so would the Brazilian authorities.
Since AOB was now compromised the Ode-
brecht men needed another bank to use and 
they found one in Antigua that was somewhat 
dormant named Mienl Bank AG, whose head-
quarters was in Austria.  The Structured Oper-
ations cronies of Soares and Migliacco bought 
51% of the Mienl Bank in Antigua.  Once the 
19 Ibid., 5.
20 Ibid., 5
21 Ibid., 7. 
22 Ibid., 7.
23 Ibid., 8.
24 Ibid., 8.
25 Ibid., 8.
bank was bought Silva and his team opened 
dozens of accounts at Meinl Bank for their fake 
consulting firms and other companies.26  33 
banks fed Odebrecht´s money into at least 71 
different Antiguan accounts and Mienl Bank 
AG stated in an email that it had “no manage-
rial control or operational insight” into its An-
tigua Branch since selling its majority stake in 
2010 and that it sold its residual 33% stake in 
late 2014.27  
Luiz Soares, who was accustomed to get-
ting the job done conspired with Luiz Franca, 
Antigua´s honorary consul in Brazil to per-
suade Antiguan Prime Minister Gaston Browne 
to block Brazil´s request to receive documents 
on Odebrecht´s accounts in the island nation.28 
The fact that the Brazilian honorary consul 
in Antigua and Barbuda was involved in this 
corruption ring illustrates the power and will 
of those in Odebrecht to break and bend the 
law to their own satisfaction.  Odebrecht pro-
posed to pay a lawyer named Casroy James 
to help sway the  prime minister;  James has 
emphatically denied this stating that his meet-
ings with Odebrecht officials were about pro-
cessing applications for a GOAB program that 
offered Antiguan citizenship to foreigners who 
invested in the country.29  Eventually James 
triumphed in getting the Odebrecht men in 
front of Antiguan Prime Minister Brown who 
was warned by Soares about how dangerous 
the Brazilian investigation was going to be to 
Antigua and Barbuda; nevertheless, Brown re-
torted that Antigua Police Investigators were 
already assembling volumes of documents for 
the Brazilian authorities as required under 
agreements between the two countries.30  This 
was the beginning of the end of Structured 
Operations in Odebrecht and the construction 
firm was about to be dealt a severe blow.  
The three leaders of Structured Opera-
tions, Silva,  Migliaccio, and Soares worked in 
26 Ibid., 9.
27 Ibid., 9.
28 Ibid., 3.
29 Ibid., 3.
30 Ibid., 4.
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Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic out of 
reach of  investigators whilst feverishly trying 
to unwind Odebrecht´s bribery operations.31 
Through a suspicious email that caught the 
eye of a Brazilian Federal Police agent named 
Felipe Pace a court order was secured in Brazil 
requiring Microsoft Corp. to give Pace access 
to the Hotmail account of Fernando Migliac-
cio.32  Within the account´s in-box, spread-
sheets and emails mapped out the daily traf-
fic of the bribery group.33  In a short span 
afterward the leaders of Structured Opera-
tions were arrested as was Marcelo Odebrecht 
who was convicted of crimes including corrup-
tion, and money laundering and sentenced to 
19 years in jail.34  Several Odebrecht employees 
that were jailed have testified in exchange for 
leniency, even Marcelo Odebrecht in exchange 
31 Ibid., 11.
32 Ibid., 14.
33 Ibid., 14.
34 Ibid., 15.
for cooperation had his sentence reduced to 
two and a half years in prison and five years 
of house arrest.  The once shining star of Bra-
zilian business, Odebrecht, announced that it 
wanted to “turn the page and leave its errors 
in the past.”35
In a military base in Antigua and Barbuda 
Edward Croft, a lanky police investigator who 
runs the office of National Drug and Money 
Laundering Policy, has been fielding a torrent 
of requests for documents, spreadsheets, and 
background reports from investigators the 
world over.36  Croft and his two man team are 
probing the accounts of Odebrecht´s Meinl 
Bank while those tied up with the bribery ring 
are in the island´s courts trying to get at the 
money.37  The prime minister of Antigua and 
Barbuda, a former banker himself, has stated 
that he is doing all he can to ensure that the 
35 Ibid., 15.
36 Ibid., 16.
37 Ibid.,17.
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former British Colony frees itself from crimi-
nals who wish to use the Caribbean country as 
a base for financial crimes.38 Prime Minister 
Gaston Browne has adamantly denied any in-
volvement in the Odebrecht scandal.  
The Odebrecht bribery ring reached around 
the world.  In Angola over $50 million were 
paid in bribes to government officials, in Ar-
gentina the construction company paid over 
$278 million in bribes and in Peru former 
President Oscar Toledo has been implicated as 
having had accepted bribes from Odebrecht.39 
The Odbrecht scandal has swept up several 
countries including Panama, Venezuela, Mo-
zambique, Colombia, and Dominican Repub-
lic to name a few, several of these countries 
are conducing ongoing investigations into the 
Brazilian firm´s businesses and contacts in 
their respective territories.  
Brazil´s Anti-Money Laundering 
Capabilities
Brazil is not aloof to money laundering; it 
has made substantial inroads over the last few 
decades in the prosecution of money launder-
ing.  At the service of the President and the 
Executive branch of Brazil is Brazil´s intel-
ligence agency the ABIN (Agência Brasilei-
ra de Inteligência) that offers analysis, risk 
evaluation, prevention and repressible action 
against money laundering.40  The 18-year-old 
ABIN plays an important role and participates 
in the COAF (Council for Financial Activities 
Control).  COAF, created in 1998, falls under 
the Brazilian Ministry of Finance and is the 
leading government entity responsible for 
investigating financial crimes in the country 
it Is comprised of representatives from the 
38 Ibid.,17.
39 “Odebrecht: Entenda a maior caso de suborno 
na história,” Terra Noticias.  December 22, 2016. 
https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/ode-
brecht-entenda-o-maior-caso-de-suborno-da-hi
storia,2ad4c9f40bf9d93e1b2fba08935c112cokps
tq92.html
40 “Lavagem de Dinheiro,” access: December 5, 
2017. http://www.abin.gov.br/atuacao/areas-pri-
oritarias/lavagem-de-dinheiro/.
regulatory and law enforcement agencies, in-
cluding the Central Bank and Federal Police. 
COAF works when a financial authority in-
forms COAF of suspicious acts when evidence 
is collected.  When the competent financial au-
thorities do not have any regulatory authority 
or oversight of the suspicious activities, speci-
fied in article 9 of the money laundering law 
(12683/12), but have strong evidence of the 
crimes provided for by law 9613/98, it shall 
report to COAF, so that it will review and if 
necessary, immediately collect the factual el-
ements of the offense transitioning evidence 
to the Public Prosecutor.41  Laundered money 
which is sent to tax havens with the objective 
of hiding illicit transactions from Brazilian au-
thorities, will be requested back to the country 
as per Law 9.613 of 3 March 1998, criminal-
izing money laundering through criminal acts 
that includes drug trafficking, terrorism, arms 
trafficking, extortion, and organized crime.42 
COAF acts as the Financial Intelligence Unit 
against illicit finance as recommended by the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-
governmental policy developing organization 
to combat money laundering.43
Decree No. 6.061 dated 15 March 2017 cre-
ated the Department of Asset Recovery and 
International Legal Cooperation – DCRI.  The 
DCRI works in hand with COAF to punish 
criminals and recuperate assets.  
DCRI´s responsibilities include 
 ▪ Articulate, integrate and propose Govern-
mental Actions in all aspects related to 
money laundering, transnational organized 
41 Laura Bijos, “The Crime of Money Laundering 
in the Brazilian Legislation,” in Law and Business 
Review Of The Americas. 2014, (Dallas:  Southern 
Methodist University of Dedman School of Law, 
2014), 17.
42 Ibid., 21.
43 Jose de Carlos Oliveira, Leonardo Simões Aga-
pito and Matheus de Alencar e Miranda, O MO-
DELO DE `AUTORREGULAÇÃO REGULADA` E 
A TEORIA DA CAPTURA: OBSTÁCULOS À EFE-
TIVIDADENO COMBATE À LAVAGEM DE DI-
NHEIRO NO BRASIL, Quaestio Iuris Vol. 10, No. 
1 (2017): 374.
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crime, recovery of assets and international 
legal cooperation
 ▪ Promote the articulation of the Executive, 
the Legislative and the Judiciary, includ-
ing the Federal Government Ministries and 
State, regarding the fight against money 
laundering and transnational organized 
crime
 ▪ Negotiate agreements and coordinate im-
plementation of active and passive interna-
tional legal cooperation, including letters 
rogatory
 ▪ Promote the dissemination of information 
on asset recovery and international legal 
cooperation, preventing and fighting mon-
ey laundering and transnational organized 
crime in the country44
In 2012 the anti-money laundering Law 
9.613/98 was amended to ensure better ef-
fectiveness and practicality and was named 
Law 12.6983/2012.  The first article of the law 
shows a more encompassing approach when 
it was amended in the 2012 version then in 
the 1998 version of the law.  This evolution 
of the anti-money laundering law showcases 
Brazil´s willingness to consistently innovate 
and become a more effective player against 
money laundering.
The Central Bank of Brazil like COAF can 
apply sanctions to illicit actors.  The Brazil-
ian Central Bank´s administrative guidelines 
regarding compliance adhere to the Finan-
cial Action Task Force´s recommendations 
(FATF).45  A cornerstone of these recommen-
44 Bijos, Ibid., 14.
45 Jose de Carlos Oliveira, Leonardo Simões Aga-
pito and Matheus de Alencar e Miranda, O MO-
DELO DE `AUTORREGULAÇÃO REGULADA` E 
A TEORIA DA CAPTURA: OBSTÁCULOS À EFE-
dations is the 10th recommendation delineat-
ing that financial institutions cannot maintain 
anonymous accounts especially when the val-
ue and complexity of transactions increases. 
In accord with FATF recommendations the 
Central Bank of Brazil must apply sanctions or 
give special attention to:
 ▪ Shell Banks and the continuous monitoring 
of them
 ▪ Be able and willing to inspect, demand oblig-
atory information, and impose financial and 
disciplinary sanctions in case an entity is not 
operating within the FATF guidelines
 ▪ Must centrally compile information related 
to investigations and analysis
 ▪ Must be able to freeze assets deriving from 
criminal activity
 ▪ Must be able to use coercive powers to ob-
tain documents, testimonials, and other evi-
dence necessary for an investigation
 ▪ Maintain and sustain information relevant 
to its systems, it must keep itself continu-
ously updated
 ▪ It must provide timely, adequate, and spe-
cific feedback to ensure that entities can fol-
low guidelines and compliance
 ▪ Guarantee that the judicial system has pro-
portional sanctions46
In 2009 over 93,000 suspected operations 
by the regulatory sectors of the Central Bank 
were passed on to the financial intelligence 
unit that is COAF and 57% of these were in-
deed illicit dealings.47 It is assumed that the 
number of communications regarding illicit fi-
TIVIDADENO COMBATE À LAVAGEM DE DI-
NHEIRO NO BRASIL, Quaestio Iuris Vol. 10, No. 
1 (2017): 370.
46 Ibid., 373. 
47 Ibid., 378.
Selected Activities Realized by COAF (Council for Financial Activities Control)
 2012 2013 2014
Possible Suspicious Activities Reports Received 1,587,427 1,286,233 1,144,542
Financial Assets blocked (in millions of BRL) 484             927,5               61,4
Punitive Action Pursued 12 10 8
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nance communicated by the Brazilian author-
ities to either the Central Bank or COAF has 
continuously superseded one million in recent 
years a dramatic increase from 2009.48
Recent Developments in Brazil have led to 
increased accountability and made the coun-
try more visible as a protagonist against illicit 
finance flows.  Switzerland´s highest court, 
the Swiss Federal Court, upheld a ruling to 
release documents regarding the Odebrecht 
investigation.49  Swiss prosecutors have said 
they received reports of about 340 suspicious 
banking relations in the case, opened about 
60 inquiries and frozen roughly $800 mil-
lion since 2014.50  Brazilian authorities have 
requested information on more than 1000 ac-
counts from more than 40 banks.51  Another, 
additional positive signs, are the actions of the 
Federal Supreme Court that have indicted the 
ex-minister of National Integration, Geddel 
Vieira on money laundering charges after the 
former minister laundered around $4 million 
through four front companies.52 Even ex-Pres-
ident Lula is being investigated for receiving 
bribes from Odebrecht in the sum of around $4 
million and the infamous Judge Sergio Moro 
is leading the inquiry.53  The institutions and 
tools are in place and becoming more known 
to the Brazilian authorities that will likely lead 
48 Ibid., 379.
49 Reuters Staff, “Brazil gets access to Swiss ac-
counts of politicians, Petrobras executives,” 
Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
-brazil-corruption-swiss/brazil-gets-access-to-
-swiss-accounts-of-politicians-petrobras-executi-
ves-idUSKCN12J1FS
50 Ibid.,
51 Ibid.,
52 Jornal Do Brasil, Fachin Manda bloquear $12,8 
milhões de Geddel Vieira Lima e parentes,  De-
cember 6, 2017, http://www.jb.com.br/pais/notí-
cias. 2017/12/06/Fachin-manda-bloquear-r-128-
-milhoes-de-geddel-vieira-lima-e-parentes/
53 Época Negócios. “Lava Jato pede perícia em da-
dos de departamento de propinas de Odebrecht, 
São Paulo,  September 12, 2017.  http://epocane-
gocios.globo.com/Brasil/noticia/2017/12/epoca-
-negocios--lava-jato-pede-pericia-em-dados-do 
-departamento-de propina-da-odebrecht.html
Brazil to become a more aggressive actor in 
the realm of combating illicit finance.
Conclusion
The Brazilian system is working as the Bra-
zilian Federal Revenue Service has claimed 
a considerable amount of monies from off-
shore accounts as the Brazilian version of the 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program is be-
ing enforced and those that have accounts that 
have been disclosed are being subject to penal-
ties and taxes.  The Repatriation Law 12.534 is 
being used as a mechanism to gain tax revenue 
from Brazilians who hold accounts offshore. 
While much of the legal framework needed to 
combat, corruption has been put in place over 
time, its success depends on the amount of 
political will available to strictly and fervently 
enforce it over the medium and long-term.54 
When understanding, illicit financial flows re-
garding Brazil it is also worth noting to look at 
trade misinvoicing. Though this topic was not 
covered in this paper goods either exported or 
imported need to be recorded at their accurate 
market price.  
No one can deny the scale and acts of these 
illicit operations were detrimental.  Billions of 
dollars have been lost by Brazil that could have 
been utilized elsewhere.  One very important 
aspect to regard is that these allegations and 
convictions are occurring.  Brazil being in the 
global spotlight as the release of the Panama 
Papers and the Odebrecht scandal has become 
a force as its institutions are gaining strength. 
The Central Bank, COAF, Public Prosecutors, 
and the Brazilian Federal Policy are pursuing 
illicit finance by conducting investigations, 
making convictions and arresting people. 
Through these high-profile cases the world 
has taken notice and Brazil has no choice but 
to act. There is an accountability that is taking 
place in the country of tomorrow that perhaps 
54 “Brazil Country Case Study:  Illicit Finance, 
Capital Flight and Macroeconomic Flows. 1960-
2012,” 2014, Washington D.C. Global Financial 
Integrity.  Access:  December 2, 2017, http://
www.gfintegrity.org/issues/data-by-country/
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gives credence to the belief that tomorrow has 
finally arrived.  
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